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Brien Williams:
This is an oral history interview for the George J. Mitchell Oral History
Project at Bowdoin College with former Senator J. Bennett Johnston. We are in the Washington
law offices of Steptoe & Johnson, LLP, where Senator Johnston serves as a government affairs
and public policy adviser, in a strategic alliance between his firm, Johnston & Associates, and
Steptoe & Johnson. Today is Thursday, August 13, 2009, and I am Brien Williams. I thought,
Senator, I’d like to start out by asking you what it was like coming to the Senate in 1972.
Bennett Johnston: Well, it was a very interesting time. I had been a state legislator, but very
much a part-time stage legislator, and I had run for governor of Louisiana in 1971 and got in the
second primary with Edwin [W.] Edwards, was projected to win by most of the polls but ended
up losing by 0.2 percent. It was an off year election in Louisiana and that very next year, ‘72, I
could run for the Senate, and ran and got elected and came to Washington without a lot of
Washington experience. People who run these days are strongly supported by the Democratic
Senatorial Campaign Committee, and they have all kinds of interest in their races. I had my own
race to run. I’m trying to remember, I think I might have gotten $1500 or something from the
DCCC, and when I arrived in town I had to call a friend to give me a ride to the Capitol, didn’t
really exactly know how to get there and where everything was.
But it was very much a different time at that time, Watergate had just happened, the operative
term was, what was it, a third-rate burglary or something like that, and you didn’t take it
seriously. It was very soon obvious that it was quite serious, and all through that year it kept
dribbling out by dribs and drabs, it is amazing how many headline revelations could come from
one story. It was quite amazing, and during all that time, of course, I was trying to get used to
the Senate. The Senate was very nonpartisan at that time, Democrats and Republican Caucuses
rarely took place, usually only to endorse the committee chairman for their particular jobs, but
almost never to plot out strategy as parties. Strategy was very much a function of the committee
chairmen and their ranking minority member, so it was very much a different time.
Watergate changed a lot of that by, first putting the press very much in the position of critics of
the process and of the members. It was a marked change at that time from, I won’t say benign
friendliness, but more friendly than it was later. And of course ever since then, my first year was
in 1973, it has been very much a steady deterioration, both in the way that senators are thought of
back home, as well as tremendous partisanship, and a general quality of life of senators.
BW:

Did you have any contact with Senator [Allen J.] Ellender, who you succeeded?
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BJ:
I was running against Senator Ellender, who at that time was I think eighty-one, was
going to be eighty-two if he’d gotten elected. I had met him but had little contact with him. He
was Senate pro-tem, and chairman of the Appropriations Committee, had not done a lot for
Louisiana in those very powerful positions, and he could have, I thought, but did not. But my
getting in the race spurred him into action to exercise the prerogatives of his office.
Before I got in the race, I took an extensive poll with a thousand personal interviews. You’d
never do that any more, it would be too expensive to do personal interviews, and they usually
have a sample of six hundred, but we had a sample of a thousand. And if I recall the numbers, I
was leading him like fifty-six to thirty-four, something like that. And we started the race, and
there was some deterioration in those numbers as the race proceeded, but I thought at the end of
the day I was going to win a reasonably close race. Although I must say, I was very impressed
with how much energy this man of eighty-one had, he maintained quite a schedule, which might
have been what ultimately killed him. He had a heart attack there in, as I recall, about two weeks
before the primary, and died. [He] got on a plane and did not want to be taken to the hospital or
anything in Louisiana, and I think he probably could have been saved if they’d taken him right to
the hospital.
But in any event, he died, and John McKeithen, who was the governor at that time and was going
out of office in a matter of weeks or months, got into the race, he wanted to get in as a Democrat
but it was past qualification time, the State Central Committee said he had to run as an
Independent, or he could not run as a Democrat so therefore he had to run as an Independent,
which I think did not affect his performance, my polls showed the same as a Democrat or as a
Republican. But I won against him and a Republican; I think I got about fifty-four percent of the
vote and they split the rest.
BW: Did you feel like you were coming in as some version of a new Democrat, or very much
in the Southern tradition?
BJ:
Well, we didn’t have such a thing as a New Democrat, but I had clearly broken ground
as friendly with and supported by black people, which was really a change. I had very strongly
campaigned with and among black people in the governor’s race, although I didn’t get a majority
of it, and was strongly supported in the Senate race. As a matter of fact, that was one of my aces
in the hole against Ellender, because he had made these terrible statements against blacks all
through his Senate career, calling them apes and this and that. As a matter of fact, Charlie Cook,
you know who Charlie Cook is?
BW:

Now, for the record, explain it.

BJ:
He is Washington’s maybe preeminent researcher of political races and political pundit,
he was then in high school, I hired him to go look at the Congressional Record and he
researched, oh, twenty or thirty of these snippets, so that was going to be a big part of the race.
But in any event, in that sense I was a new Democrat. Now by that time, southern Democrats
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had come around to be reasonably friendly with blacks, certainly my colleague Russell Long had
been. Some of the old bulls of Stennis and Eastland had a long history of opposing Civil Rights,
but I think that opposition to blacks had been pretty well past and they were not as culturally able
to converse with the black community as some of us younger ones were. In that sense, I was
very much a New Democrat. I was very traditional in supporting, for example, the oil and gas
industry in Louisiana, a producing state. So, it was very much a new era, we did not feel
hidebound; I mean we had our traditional interests in the South which we all supported.
BW: In terms of the structure of the Senate when you came in, in ‘72, the old bulls were still
the leading chairmen of the committees.
BJ:

Right, right.

BW:

And what kind of influence did they exert?

BJ:
Well, as I say, policy was pretty much made by the chairmen and their ranking minority
members, most committees had a very close relationship between the chairmen and the ranking
minority members. Russell Long did tax policy, I think Bob Dole was his long time ranking
minority member, they were very close and they found ways to work together. And I think
virtually every committee was like that, you rarely saw a floor fight against a committee
chairman and what they brought out of committee.
BW:

But I think I heard you say that by ‘74, with the post-Watergate, that began to change.

BJ:
Well, I won’t say as early as ‘74. The criticism of the press certainly began to change. It
was a gradual evolution. By 1980, let’s see, I guess it must have been the election of ‘81 with
Ronald Reagan that really brought in the partisanship. That’s when the Republicans were
ideological and they had their agenda, and it was very hard to be against Ronald Reagan at that
time, he was tremendously popular. I remember seeing him at press conferences and thinking
how embarrassingly bad he was at answering questions, and the public just loved it. So I knew
better than to get out there and oppose him strongly.
Each year it got more partisan, and as it got more partisan, I don’t remember when we began to
have the party caucuses, I suspect it was by the late ‘70s, but more and more partisan every time.
Jesse Helms created the so-called Wedge Amendment. When we came there was never an
amendment which was not at least intended by the author to be serious. But the Wedge
Amendment was one that sounded good but it would make you vote to oppose taking money
from one purpose to give to the crippled children so that they could have a thirty-second ad that
said, “Bennett Johnston opposes my crippled children.” And he would have a lot of those
amendments, and people didn’t quite understand why he was doing it, but they soon understood
and then both sides began to do it.
Now you have, particularly on the Budget, what they call a ‘votorama’ where they have just
dozens of these votes one after another that are not seriously debated, they’re not serious
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amendments, but they’re seriously intended to give the stuff of thirty-second ads.
BW: I was impressed that three years I guess after you arrived, you became the chairman of
the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee.
BJ:

Right.

BW:

That was a quick rise to an important position in the structure of the party, right?

BJ:
Yes, it was not as important as it is now; we didn’t raise that much money. Money was
not as big a deal at that time as it is now. But it was, yes, I was very pleased to get that position.
BW: I saw a list of the chairs of that committee on the Internet, and yours was the first name,
so when was that committee created? At the time you took over as -?
BJ:
No, Fritz Hollings was chairman when I was running, and then Lloyd Bentsen, and then
I succeeded Lloyd Bentsen.
BW: Right, right. And the election year of ‘76, when you were the chairman, was one with a
lot of changeover, a lot of new faces in the Senate but interestingly, the balance of power
between Republicans and Democrats didn’t change.
BJ:

Right.

BW:

What was it like as an election year?

BJ:
Well it was very interesting, with Jimmy Carter. I was a strong supporter of Jimmy
Carter, and I was his campaign chairman in Louisiana. And I must say I was very disappointed
in Carter, I thought he was going to be much better politically than he was in the sense of the
tenor of the country and all that, and he got in just immediately and was contrary to the
Congress. After he was defeated, and he didn’t come back to Washington for over a year, but he
finally came back and had some kind of dinner somewhere, not one member of Congress was
invited to that dinner, which kind of tells you something about his relationship with the
Congress. And a lot of us were very hurt, and we thought it was something relating to us, but he
was that way with all the members. I’m quite friendly with him now, I mean I was always
friendly with him, but it was just a, as I say, a big disappointment.
BW: So did you become disheartened right after he came, his administration came into office,
or was there -?
BJ:

Pretty quick, yes.

BW:

Did you try to steer him on a different course at all?
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BJ:
Well, he came in first of all with the hit list on the water projects, and at that time I was
chairman of the Energy and Water Appropriations Subcommittee which had jurisdiction over
water project. And water projects were very important politically to members, and as a strong
supporter of infrastructure, I think they’re important to the country. And Carter got in with some
environmentalist idea that the Corps of Engineers was bad and so he was going to make a hit list.
Well, I put in an amendment which said, in effect, ‘you can’t do that, Mr. President,’ and it
passed overwhelmingly, but it was just a whole series of things. Remember what they called ‘the
malaise time,’ he just didn’t quite get it.
BW: Now, you had a reelection in ‘78. How did you handle inoculating yourself from the
Carter administration? Or maybe you didn’t?
BJ:
Well, I didn’t attend to that much. The big part of that race was keeping out, or hoping
that some of the stronger candidates did not run, and they didn’t. And as I recall, I won by
eighty-six percent of the vote, and so it was not much of a problem in ‘78. Edwin Edwards had
been my rival ever since the governor’s race, and every year the Morning Advocate, the
newspaper, would run a poll and all about the Senate race, they did that for four or five years.
And the year before the election it showed me winning like fifty-one to thirty against Edwards,
and Edwards said, “Well I never intended to run for the Senate,” and that was because he
couldn’t win. And then nobody else of note got in the race.
BW:

Were you out in front for Carter in ‘80 when he ran for reelection?

BJ:

I was, I appeared for him. I was not, he didn’t ask and I didn’t take this big role.

BW:

But you had joint appearances in the state?

BJ:

Yes.

BW: Did you and the other Democrats see the Reagan revolution ahead of time, for ‘80, or did
that come as a surprise?
BJ:
It, certainly the extent of it came as a surprise. I’d been chairman of the Campaign
Committee at that time – no, no, I was not chairman of the Campaign Committee, but I still had
my contact. And I remember a friend of mine who had been one of my political advisors, calling
me on Election Day and he said, “Something is happening out there, it’s just crazy.” And that’s
when we lost all those seats, it was just amazing. And of course Carter lost. The polls did not
show the Reagan surge, at least not before the final minutes of the campaign, and so it had been a
great surprise to everybody, a shock to everyone.
BW:

And as you mentioned earlier, it caused a lot of changes in the Senate.

BJ:
Oh, indeed. Well, did we lose twelve seats at that time? I think it was twelve. And
people we had thought were just not vulnerable at all went down; it was a bad Democratic year.
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BW: Now, just prior to the November election, Ed Muskie went over to the State Department,
and George Mitchell replaced him in May of ‘80. Had you had a close relationship with Ed
Muskie?
BJ:
Yes, reasonably close. I was on the Budget Committee, of which he was a chairman,
and it was not a close personal relationship but it was a friendly relationship and I had worked on
a number of legislative issues with him.
BW:

What were your first impressions of George Mitchell when he arrived?

BJ:
Well, George is always a charmer, and I liked him from the first time I met him and all
the way through. He was just a wonderful person. We were quite friendly, we played tennis
together, I recall going on a trip or two with him, I don’t remember where, maybe just some of
the Democratic trips, so we were quite friendly.
BW: At what point did you see him as having potential as a leader of the party, and potentially
a rival?
BJ:
You know, I don’t remember. I had, it’s very curious, we ran against one another for
majority leader, I didn’t initially have the idea of running. There were two liberals who were
friends of mine who had come to me on the floor and said, “Bennett, you ought to run for
leader.” I forget whether George was a candidate at that time, might not have been, but I know
one of those particularly – I don’t want to say who because I don’t want to have them
embarrassed but, one is dead now – but not just one conversation, but dozens of conversations,
‘you need to run.’
And by the time the election came up, both voted for Mitchell. So I thought with these two great
and influential liberals that it would not be a hard thing for a Democrat from the south to get
elected. I’d been very much a leader, particularly on appropriations bills, I handled the
Appropriations Committee for John Stennis, and so in retrospect, it seems that it was kind of a
dumb thing to think that a relatively conservative southerner who’d been a right-to-life, who’d
been with the oil industry, who had not had a great record on labor, could be elected majority
leader.
And when I started out, I used to keep a list of people and how they were, who’s for me and
who’s leaning, et cetera, and I had a majority, including leaners. Of course leaners are –
Mitchell may have had the same kind of list and might have had those leaners on his list – but it
seemed at least early on that it was entirely winnable. But at the end of the day, not only
Mitchell’s charm and ability, but the basic politics if you’re a northeastern Democrat you’ve got
your labor, you’ve got your choice people, you’ve got your unions, you’ve got all of those
things, which at the end of the day, I think that along with Mitchell’s natural political ability and
charm brought the day.

Page 6 of 14

I forget what the count was but it was, on the first ballot Danny Inouye was also running, and
between Inouye and I we had a majority of votes. But I knew where every vote was, and it
seemed to me not a winnable race for either one of us and I told Inouye, “Why don’t we just
withdraw and make it unanimous,” which we did.
BW:

After the first ballot.

BJ:

After the first ballot, right.

BW: What was it like going around? I assume you went around to your colleagues to
campaign for this position, what was that experience like?
BJ:
Well, it was very interesting. Senators are very cagey and they don’t want to tell you
they’re against you. And some will, I mean some who are committed and you know who they
are and why they are, and basically you’re not offended at that sort of thing. The only thing is,
it’s offensive when somebody tells you they’re going to be for you and then they end up not
voting for you. There was a whole series of things, I wrote every member a personal letter, and
sought most members more than once; you try to calibrate that so you don’t make a nuisance of
yourself.
BW: How did you know then who voted for you and who voted for the other two, because
you say the two liberals that came to you at first, you know that they did not support you when it
came to the ballot.
BJ:
Yes, by that time they had, the communication had, they never did tell me that they were
going, I just knew it. I forget how I knew it, but you could, there were two senators who had told
me they were going to vote for me who ended up not voting [for me], and I just knew because I
knew they were the two who would, you know where every vote is, and when it ended up that
way I knew who they would be.
BW:

You mean they did not cast a vote at all, is that what you’re saying?

BJ:

Oh yes, they voted, and it was secret ballot. You just know.

BW:

So you never knew, no one ever handed you the results by name.

BJ:

No.

BW:

So it was all guesswork, or analysis, where you could figure out.

BJ:

You know.

BW: I see, so what the aftermath of that like? I mean how do you then go back to your caucus
and -?
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BJ:
Oh, it’s, look, it is no problem. That’s one thing about the Senate, it was entirely
friendly; it was always friendly between me and Mitchell. And George said he would appoint
me on the Intelligence Committee, which he did, and it was not a problem in the caucus. You’ve
got so many issues that come up in the Senate, you win a great victory this day, and about the
time you are enjoying the exultation of it, then you lose another one, it’s just a whole series of
things. And your relationship with the colleagues, it’s not at all personal, as I say, George
Mitchell and I were very friendly through it all, as Danny Inouye was, and so that’s just not a
problem.
BW: Part of the literature on that election was that you were giving forth just prior to the vote
that you were pretty certain that you were going to win, is that correct? To the press and so
forth?
BJ:
I don’t think I ever put it quite that strongly, I think I put it that with the commitments
and the leaners, I said I thought I could win.
BW: So when you came home that night and told your wife what had happened in school
today, how did you characterize it?
BJ:
Well, this takes place over a period of weeks, and I think by the Election Day, I won’t
say it was clear, but it was not nearly as it had been. I was certainly not confident of winning; I
thought there was a chance. You know, senators will tell you, sometimes they’ll tell you and
sometimes they won’t, those who I had down as undecided and some who said they’d support
me, I remember at least one or maybe two that supported me on the second ballot, and so it
seemed possible at that time. But it was not like I thought I was going to win and came home
and said, “Honey, it didn’t work.”
BW:

So how would you characterize George Mitchell then, as your leader?

BJ:
Well, George was a very effective leader. He just drove the Republicans crazy, because
he didn’t give them anything they could really put their hands on, and he was so articulate and
would make the Democratic position to be so logical and so appealing that it was hard to be
against him, so he drove them crazy. He was attentive to his members, which leaders need to be.
A lot of senators don’t really want a leader; they want somebody to just manage things so they
can do their own thing, but George was a real leader and he directed the party.
BW:

Did he meet much resistance?

BJ:
Well, not everybody followed him on everything he wanted to do, I mean obviously, but
there was no insurgency against him at any time.
BW:

Did he have any Achilles’ heels?
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BJ:
I don’t recall it. He was considered to be a liberal when not everybody was a liberal, so
to those who were the most conservative, he would not be exactly where they would be, but
that’s not an Achilles’ heel.
BW:

What about his relations with the Republicans? How did you see him working that line?

BJ:
I think he got along well. I think it was Bob Dole then who was Republican leader, and I
think they had a good personal relationship. Most leaders and ranking minorities have a good
relationship. That was about the only time that didn’t work was with, oh, what’s-his-name from
Tennessee, Bill Frist, and Daschle. What the first thing Bill Frist did was to take out the hot line
between the leaders; we don’t need that kind of thing, but mostly they have a good relationship.
As I say, I think he drove them crazy, I mean they liked him – I say they liked him, it had gotten
to be so ideological, and it’s gotten stronger and stronger. With Daschle, Daschle was also very,
very effective, and very likeable, but they made him into a poster child of being this terrible guy,
and so these Republicans repeat all this over and over again, so I can’t say. The party’s not
monolithic but I can’t say they loved him. As I say, I think he drove them crazy.
BW: Had you been party to, well no, let me ask you this way, what was the story behind Byrd
no longer being the majority leader and going over to Appropriations?
BJ:
I don’t know, I don’t think he ever quite explained his inner thoughts, but he’d been
leader for a long time, and being Appropriations chairman he could do a lot of things for his
state. He’s perfected the art of the earmark for his state, which was a poor state and needed help.
He didn’t do that as majority leader. I had Energy and Water which was a big source of
discretionary spending, and I’m sure we did things for West Virginia, as we did for every state,
but he didn’t do that very much. And I’m sure he saw that as a way to help Virginia, and the
chairman of the Appropriations Committee, I don’t remember whether he took that immediately,
I guess he must have, as soon as it became vacant, as soon as, I guess Stennis, because he
followed Stennis.
And so I think he took it as soon as it became available. And the Appropriations chairman,
which was one of the things I had to think about when I retired, whether I wanted to wait around
and try to be Appropriations chairman, and interestingly enough, I’ve now been retired, what,
twelve years, and still wouldn’t be Appropriations chairman. And that’s a prize of great worth,
so I think that’s what it was.
BW: Shifting back to Mitchell, what role did he play as majority leader in relations with the
White House? I’m thinking of George H.W. Bush and then Bill Clinton, what was his role there,
if any?
BJ:
Well, certainly the majority leader is, I mean he was an expert on health care, and he
played an active role in the Clinton health care bill, and as I recall he supported that. When did
he retire?
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BW:

He, in ‘95, he did not seek reelection in ‘94.

BJ:
Yes, and the Clinton tax policies, I think he, he was an ally of Democrats in the White
House.
BW: Okay. It struck me in looking at the Democratic Party at the time he became the
majority leader that there really were some pretty strong factions. There were those of you with
the sort of Southern tradition, and then the New Democrats, I think of like Chuck Robb coming
in in ‘88 sort of representing that new blood type of thing, and then there was the Metzenbaum
traditional liberal wing of the party. Would you agree that that sort of was the spectrum there,
and each had sort of their own interests and so forth?
BJ:
Yes, certainly in Energy, Metzenbaum was on the Energy Committee, Metzenbaum
didn’t represent a wing, he represented, he was sort of the lone Democratic real liberal. But I
guess we did have, I guess we did have wings. Southerners would tend to vote together on a lot
of things, certainly the oil and gas states would stick together.
BW: But was George Mitchell effective in keeping you all moving along the same track, or
was he having to deal with a lot of factions?
BJ:
Yes, I think he was. He was not quite as assertive on policy matters maybe as Harry
Reid is now. For example, Harry Reid on one of these Energy bills just bypassed the committee
altogether and put the bill out. Mitchell would have – which I thought was a terrible idea to do
for Reid, and it didn’t work – but Mitchell was much more effective working with the committee
chairmen and gently moving people. He didn’t crack the whip, he did it very much by subtle
persuasion.
BW:

Did you share any committee assignments with him, was Intelligence one, for example?

BJ:

No, we were not on committees together.

BW: Let’s turn to issues of the day, you’ve mentioned some of them. Were you strongly
together with George Mitchell on some issues that came up, I mean you worked hand-in-hand in
promoting certain legislation, or not?
BJ:
Well I voted with him on many, many matters, but we weren’t on committees together so
I was just a passive voter on most of these issues, and he would be a passive voter on most of my
issues.
BW:

So were there any issues where you sort of locked heads, locked horns, I’m sorry.

BJ:
Oh, I think on one, the DG-51 destroyer which we wanted to try to build in Louisiana,
and which had been built at Bath or wherever, and we were on opposite sides of that issue, and
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he won.
BW:

Yes, talk about that a little bit, because that’s come up in some other interviews.

BJ:
Yes, well, it’s just a competition for jobs in your state, and I forget exactly how it came
up but I wanted to see if I could get some of that for Louisiana and was not successful in doing
so.
BW: I was surprised there was a third player in that, wasn’t there, a shipyard in Mississippi,
right?
BJ:

I think so.

BW: Ingall’s, right. So you were, were you as locked horns with Mississippi on that one as
you were with -?
BJ:

You know I really don’t recall that, that much.

BW:

Were there any particular Maine-Louisiana issues that you shared, or not?

BJ:

I don’t think so.

BW: Now, where were you on the Clean Air Bill, which many people say was his major
achievement legislatively, in 1990?
BJ:
I voted for it and I remember going to one White House meeting, but again, that was in
EPW Committee and not in the Energy Committee, so I wasn’t directly involved in it.
BW: In some very interesting readings as I was preparing for this interview, with the energy
bills from ‘91 and ‘92, there was first the Johnston-Wallop Bill, which did not pass as I recall,
and then the next year you came back with another energy bill which Christopher Dodd called
one of the major legislative achievements in the 102nd Congress. So talk a little bit about that.
BJ:
Well actually it was not in successive years, it was in the same Congress. And it was a
very broad energy bill that, and as a matter of fact we’d picked pieces of other committees’
jurisdiction because they involved energy, for example, nuclear, which was, at least notionally an
EPW Committee, Environment and Public Works, one of the biggest pieces was the deregulation
of electricity and that was in Banking, so we had this very broad bill.
We had two particular pieces of it that were highly controversial, one was ANWR drilling, and
the other was CAFE standards. ANWR was just a big fight, and we had a cloture vote on that,
and as I recall we got, was it fifty-seven or fifty-eight votes. I had a vote or two that said, I’ll
break your tie, but I won’t swell your total, and so it came very close, it was like fifty-eight or
fifty-nine votes, but we didn’t have enough.
Page 11 of 14

And on CAFE, Dick Bryan had had a very extreme, I thought, bill, and we had had extensive
hearings and just looked at it, projected, we’d be saving a couple million barrels a day if we had
done our form of the bill. And early on the auto industry seemed to indicate that this was
something they could live with, it was achievable, you didn’t have to reduce power or the size of
cars, you’d get this payoff with better technology. And of course as the Bryan bill got less and
less popular, then Detroit thought, well we can build SUVs and whatever, and so they turned
against that part of it.
So the bill had sort of gone down, and we reincarnated it. I think it was in the same Congress,
yes, I think it kind of slept there for a month or two and we brought it back. And it was still a
very big bill, it just didn’t have those two pieces of it.
BW:

That was the difference really, ANWR and CAFE.

BJ:

Yes, we dropped them both and got all the rest.

BW:

How invested were you personally in the ANWR side of it?

BJ:
Oh, very much. I’d taken Energy Committee people up there I think three or four times,
and was totally confident it could be done safely and environmentally friendly way, and I
thought it was kind of a phony issue, and still think it’s a great idea.
BW: But you probably took a lot of heat from the liberal environmental wing of the
Democratic Party.
BJ:

Oh yes, sure, sure.

BW: In view of the shortness of time here, let’s, I’m going to skip ahead I guess. Although I,
let’s just, just tell me a little bit about the BTU tax, in the Clinton budget.
BJ:
Well, it was not a bad idea, but certainly from - There’s some things you can do with
your states and some things you can’t. In Louisiana you got to be right-to-life, you got to be progun – I never made a speech on any of those subjects – and you got to be pro-oil and gas, and
BTU tax was totally opposed by oil and gas industry, and I was at first publicly undecided and
then realized I had to be, I couldn’t represent my state.
BW: Considering the energy bills and then something like the BTU tax, was Mitchell a major
player in these things, or was he not?
BJ:
I don’t remember him being a major player on BTU. I’m sure he had been to some
extent. I don’t think it came up for a vote in the Senate, as I recall. And as a matter, that’s one
reason so many of the Blue Dogs like Billy Tauzin from, who was a Democrat from Louisiana,
and they walked the plank and voted for the BTU tax, and then it didn’t come up in the Senate
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and that’s when he, at least ostensibly, that was the reason he switched over to the Republican
Party.
BW: I asked you about foreseeing the Reagan revolution in ‘80, what about the revolution in
‘94, with the Republicans Gingrich and crowd coming in, did you all foresee that?
BJ:
We were very hopeful, and Mitchell worked very hard on that and did an excellent job, I
mean he really, I think that had a lot to do with him being elected majority leader, because he
made so many good friends out there and was so effective as a leader of the party.
BW: But what I’m talking about is a Republican revolution in 1994, when they came in, took
over the House and BJ:
Oh, I was thinking, excuse me, I was thinking of ‘86, yes. Oh, in ‘94, that was pretty
foreseeable. It was not quite as much of a surprise, particularly in states like mine, I mean the
South had begun to really become very Republicanized.
BW: Do you think it had anything to do with George Mitchell decided to resign from the
Senate?
BJ:

I hadn’t, well he decided to resign before that election.

BW:

Yes.

BJ:
idea.

I was not, would not be aware of that, I mean know what went on in his mind, I have no

BW:

What influence did it have on your own decision to leave, if any?

BJ:
Well, we had lost the majority at that time, and that is one factor. But really, senators
have to decide at a certain point whether they’re going to stay for the duration, à la Bob Byrd,
Danny Inouye, or Fritz Hollings, et cetera, and go for as long as they’re able, or whether they
want to get out and start a new career. And that was the principal thing with me, that I thought it
was time to get out while I still had a lot of juice and have another career. I’d been in the Senate
for twenty-four years, I’d been in public office for thirty-two years, and that was the main
motivating force, and that was the right decision for me. But having lost the majority was clearly
an additional factor, because when you’re committee chairman, it’s a lot different than when
you’re ranking minority member, and particularly when you have a committee chairman who’s
not interested in running his committee in a bipartisan way.
BW:

In your judgment, when was the best time to have been in the Senate?

BJ:
Well in my case, I enjoyed very much legislating. Various senators are, some like to
make speeches and like to be in the public spotlight, and I can name a lot of those now that you
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see getting a lot of that coverage, and I was not immune from wanting to do that, but what I
really liked to do was legislate. So my years as chairman of the Energy Committee, and at the
same time being chairman of Energy and Water, were certainly very good.
Now, the early years, I enjoyed the whole time but for different reasons. I was younger, less
influential, in the early years we took nice trips, we had great friends, it was a very pleasant
experience the whole time.
BW:

Last question, how do you think George Mitchell ought to be remembered?

BJ:
Well, I think he has really achieved statesman status, which is a term liberally thrown
around but achieved by very few. And he clearly did that, and his post-Senate career has been a
continuation of that. And I think he is thought of in those almost reverential terms by those of us
who knew him, reverential not in the sense of being above everybody in terms of personal
relationships, but in terms of skill, ability, moral clarity, et cetera, et cetera, and I think he
achieved that, and I’m a great admirer and friend.
BW:

Great, thank you very much, Senator.

BJ:

You bet.

End of Interview
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